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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner Casey was convicted by a jury of attempted murder (a second degree
felony, aggravated assault (a third degree felony), and domestic violence in the
presence of a child (a third degree felony). Direct appeal was made to the Utah Court
of Appeals, which affirmed Casey's convictions. Casey then filed a petition for certiorari
in this court, and the petition was granted. This court takes jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The sole issue subject to certiorari review is whether the Utah Court of Appeals
erred in holding that even though State v. Vigil requires proof of a conscious objective
or desire to kill, the crime of attempted murder can be committed with a "knowing" state
of mind. This court reviews the interpretation of a statutory scheme for correctness,
according no deference to a lower court's conclusions of law. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d
930, 937 (Utah 1998).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and
"criminal negligence or criminally negligent.
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire
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to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101. Attempt-Elements of offense.
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the
offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward
commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step
unles>s it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed
had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. Murder. [1996]
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another;
(d) [felonymurder];
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(e) [recklessly cause death of peace officer].
(3) Murder is a first degree felony.
* * •

*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As a result of an altercation with his girlfriend, Michael Shawn Casey was
charged in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, with attempted murder,
aggravated assault, and committing a domestic violence crime in the presence of a
child. (R. 34) A jury convicted Casey on all three counts and the trial judge sentenced
him to prison. (R. 189) After the judge imposed the sentence, Casey filed a motion to
vacate his convictions arguing that the jury was improperly instructed on the mental
state required for the crime of attempted murder. (R. 142) Specifically, Casey argued
that under Utah law he could only be convicted of attempted murder if the state proved
he acted intentionally. The jury, however, was instructed it could find that Casey acted
intentionally or knowingly. (R. 95-96) The trial court decided the issue on the merits
and denied the motion, ruling that the jury was properly instructed on the mental state
required for an attempted murder conviction. (R. 193)
Casey appealed his convictions to the Utah Court of Appeals raising several
contentions of error regarding the attempted murder conviction and the aggravated
assault conviction (R. 202; Appellant's Brief on Appeal); the court of appeals affirmed
on all grounds.
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Casey then filed a petition for certiorari in this Court on the sole issue that he
was wrongly convicted of attempted murder since the jury instructions permitted the jury
to find that Casey acted with an intentional or knowing state of mind. This Court
granted the petition in an order dated September 26, 2001.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
According to trial testimony of the victim, Tresa Franz, on April 12, 1999, Franz
and Casey were in the process of ending a months'-long sexual relationship. (Trial
Transcript 134-35) [Hereinafter "Tr."] On that day, Franz, Casey, a man named Terron
Allred, and Franz's four year old son Quincy drove to a friend's house in a Jeep Tracker
to move Franz's truck. (Tr. 135-36) Casey and Franz sat in the front seat while Quincy
and Terron sat in back. (Tr. 142)
After the group moved the truck to a nearby school, they stopped at a liquor
store and purchased a pint of rum. (Tr. 137, 310-11, 400) According to Franz, she and
Terron each had a swig of alcohol from the bottle and Casey drank the rest. (Tr. 137,
175-76,497-99)
After the trip to the liquor store, the group drove to Tiffany Ribe's house near
North Temple and 1500 West. (Tr. 142-44) Franz testified that when they arrived at
the house, Casey got out of the Tracker and walked over to a group of girls. (Tr. 14445) When Casey returned to the truck, he told Terron to get out. (Tr. 145) Terron
complied. As Casey got back into the truck, he reached behind the seat and grabbed
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an object that he held next to his thigh. (Tr. 146, 177) According to Franz, she asked
Casey if he was ready to go home. Casey responded, "Fuck you, bitch. I'm going to
take you home all right." Casey then revealed a gun and put it to Franz's head or neck.
(Tr. 146-47)
Tiffany Ribe apparently observed what was taking place in the vehicle and ran
from the back porch to the Tracker to tell Casey and the others to leave. (Tr. 147-49,
197)
As Casey put the gun down, Franz jumped out of the vehicle and ran into
Tiffany's house. Casey ran into the house for Franz, and she ran back to the Tracker
for Quincy. (R. 149) When Casey returned to the truck, he told Franz to get in. She
did so. (Tr. 149-50) Terron also got back into the truck and Casey began to pull out of
the driveway. (Tr. 150)
At that point, Casey again put the gun to Franz's head. He pulled the trigger.
Franz testified she heard a click but nothing happened. (Tr. 151, 153) Casey then
pointed the gun down and fired a shot in the direction of Franz's feet. (Tr. 153) Again
Casey pointed the gun at her head. (Tr. 154) According to Franz, she grabbed
Casey's arm and pushed the gun into the air. She then jumped from the Tracker, which
she claimed was traveling at 35 miles per hour. (Tr. 154, 208)
However, Terron testified that after he got back in the car and the group was
driving away, Casey pointed the gun in the air, pulled the trigger, and the gun misfired.
(Tr. 316) Terron, who was sitting in the backseat, testified that he did not see Casey
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point the gun at Franz's head. (Tr. 352) This testimony was contradicted, however, by
the testimony of a police officer, who stated that during an interview with Terron the
night of the incident Terron reported that Casey put the gun to Franz's head and she
moved it away. (Tr. 389) Terron did not tell the officer that Casey put the gun to
Franz's head and the gun misfired. Casey testified that the gun misfired when he
pointed it in the air. (Tr. 477)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed Casey's conviction for attempted murder,
holding that the jury was properly instructed that it could find Casey guilty if he acted
"intentionally" or "knowingly". This instruction was erroneous. Under Utah Law, and the
holding in State v. Vigil 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), in an attempted murder case the
prosecution must prove that the accused acted with the conscious objective or desire to
kill, language which tracks the definition of "intentionally" in the Utah Code. This is a
higher standard than the "knowingly" standard that the jury was permitted to consider.
Accordingly, Casey was wrongfully convicted of attempted murder, and the case must
be remanded to the district court for a new trial.

6

ARGUMENT
I.

The Utah Court of Appeals erred in holding that even though State v. Vigil
requires proof of a conscious objective or desire to kill, the crime of
attempted murder can be committed with a "knowing" state of mind.
On direct appeal, Casey argued that the jury was improperly instructed on the

crime of attempted murder because the jury was permitted to find that the offense was
committed intentionally or knowingly when instead the jury should have been instructed
that the state needed to prove that Casey acted with a conscious objective or desire to
cause death. However, on appeal the Utah Court of Appeals rejected Casey's
argument and held that the jury was properly instructed because attempted murder can
be committed either intentionally or knowingly.
The dispositive case in this appeal is State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992),
which clearly identifies the mental state required to prove attempted murder: a
conscious objective or desire to cause death. Casey now requests this Court to
reaffirm its earlier statement in Vigil that, based on its interpretation of Utah's attempt
statute, attempted murder is a specific intent crime and that a knowing state of mind is
insufficient to support a conviction.
The analysis of this issue begins with State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah
1982). In Maestas, this Court rejected an attempt to graft a common law mens rea
standard to Utah's statutory mens rea requirement for attempted murder. Although the
Maestas court was not asked to address the precise issue of the difference between an
intentional or knowing attempted murder, it is nevertheless true the court concluded that
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"[t]he instructions to the jury correctly described the elements of attempted first degree
murder and defined the terms Intentionally' and 'knowingly' in precisely the language
used by the Utah Criminal Code." j d at 907. The opinion also stressed "there can be
no difference between the intent required as an element of the crime of attempted first
degree murder and that required for first degree murder itself." Id, at 904.
Ten years later, however, this Court flatly rejected its earlier pronouncement that
there is no difference in the intent requirements for murder and attempted murder.1
State v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), refined and amplified the earlier reasoning of
Maestas and gave a more thorough interpretation to Utah's attempt statute in
conjunction with the murder statute. Although Vigil involved a challenge to a conviction
for attempted depraved indifference murder, this Court set forth the standard that
applies to any attempted murder case:
We hold that to convict a defendant of attempted second degree murder,
the prosecution must prove that the defendant had a conscious objective
or desire to cause the death of another. Because the mental state
required for depraved indifference homicide falls short of that intent, the
crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide does not exist in

1

Development of the law in Utah was already headed in this direction. In 1989
this Court noted that other states with attempt statutes similar to Utah's required a
specific intent to kill as the required mental state for attempted murder. State v.
BellJ85 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1989). At issue in Bell, however, was the validity of the
crime of attempted felony murder, so the opinion did not specifically address the issue
now before this Court. However, a footnote in the case, id at 393 n.13, cites a long list
of cases supporting the proposition argued in this appeal, to wit, that attempted murder
requires a specific intent to kill.
8

Utah.2
i d at 848.
To reach that result this Court concluded: "We believe that the most reasonable
approach, in light of the statutory language and our cases, is to read the word 'intent' in
paragraph (2) of the attempt statute [Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101] as that word is
defined in section 76-2-103(1 )."3 \jL The Court noted that as a matter of statutory
construction it is normally presumed "that when the legislature defines a term of art and
later uses that term in the same body of statutes, it intends a consistent meaning." kL
Under section 76-2-103(1), a person engages in conduct "[intentionally, or with
intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct,

2

In the opinion by the court of appeals in this case, the court quoted this entire
passage. What the court of appeals did not do, however, is point out that the mental
state for a knowing homicide also falls short of the legal standard described in the first
sentence of the passage. The statutory definition of "intentionally" with respect to a
defendant's state of mind is not the equivalent of the definition of "knowingly." See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) and (2).
3

The attempt statute reads in pertinent part:

(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the
offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward
commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (emphasis added).
9

when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the
result." In contrast, under section 76-2-103(2), a person engages in conduct
"[kjnowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result." The Court reasoned that "the word Intent' as used in paragraph (2) of the
attempt statute should be read to mean 'conscious objective or desire.' This meaning
of the word Intent' obviously is distinguishable from knowledge of the proscribed
conduct or result, which is the mental state required for depraved indifference
homicide." jd, at 847 (emphasis added). Thus the plain language of the Vigil holding
dictates that knowledge is insufficient to support a conviction for attempted murder.
In analyzing the statutory construction issue, the Vigil court cited the
commentaries of the Model Penal Code and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code,
observing: "the commentaries make clear that both the MPC and PFCC attempt
provisions require a more culpable mental state than recklessness for conduct that
creates the substantial step. The PFCC attempt provision requires intentional conduct
. . . and the MPC attempt provision requires either intentional conduct or the belief that
the actor's conduct will result in the proscribed act." 842 P.2d at 846-47 (citations
omitted). By requiring proof of a conscious objective or desire to kill, the Court in Vigil
interpreted Utah's attempt statute consistent with the PFCC provision, requiring
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intentional conduct. The Vigil holding, by its plain terms, does not adopt the MPC
approach which in fact permits proof of a state of mind closely resembling Utah's
statutory definition of "knowingly."
The Vigil approach, making attempted murder a specific intent crime, reflects the
great weight of authority. As Professor LaFave has noted: "Under the approach
generally taken in the modern codes, 'intent' is narrowly defined to distinguish it from
'knowledge.' See § 3.5(a). This means the knowledge mental state, though proper for
the crime of murder, should not be used in attempt murder jury instructions." Wayne R.
LaFave, Criminal Law § 6.2(c)(1) at 541 n.73 (3rd ed. 2000).4 Professor LaFave also
observes that most modern codes (like Utah's) have not adopted the attempt provision
drafted by the authors of the Model Penal Code. k i at 542 n.84; see also State v.
Debarros, 755 A.2d 303, 309 (Conn. Ct. App. 2000) (to act intentionally, as is required
for attempted murder conviction, accused must have had a conscious objective to
cause death); Commonwealth v. Spells, 612 A.2d 458, 460 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1992)
(specific intent necessary to support conviction for attempted murder); Austin v. State,
600 A.2d 1142, 1145 (Md. Ct. App. 1992) (person can be convicted of attempted
murder only where there is a specific and actual intent to kill); Haywood v.
Commonwealth, 458 S.E.2d 606, 607 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (person cannot be guilty of
attempted murder unless he had a specific intent to kill); State v. Coble, 527 S.E.2d 45,

4

"Although murder may be committed without an intent to kill, attempt to commit
murder requires a specific intent to kill." 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law §
743 (14th ed. 1981); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 351 (1991).
11

47 (N.C. 2000) (same); State v. Williams. 670 So. 2d 414, 416 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(same); Minter v. State. 653 N.E.2d 1382, 1383 (Ind. 1995) (same); People v. Hill. 658
N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (III Ct. App. 1995) (same); State v. Kimbrouah. 924 S.W.2d 888,
891 (Tenn. 1996) (same); Ochoa v. State. 981 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Nevada 1999) (intent
to kill a human being is an essential element of attempted murder); State v. Buckley.
953 P.2d 604, 605-07 (Idaho 1998) (attempted murder conviction reversed where jury
instructions did not explain that prosecution had to prove intent to kill); McCurrv v.
State. 763 So.2d 989, 991 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (attempted murder requires
perpetrator to act with specific intent to commit murder; general felonious intent is not
sufficient);
Notwithstanding the holding in Vigil that to support a charge of attempted murder
the state must prove a conscious objective or desire to cause the death of another, the
Court dropped a footnote stating in dictum that "Maestas is still good law insofar as it
authorizes prosecution for. . . attempted murder under the intentional or knowing
formulation of section 76-5-203(1 )(a)." |dL at 848 n.5. This language constitutes the
crux of the court of appeals' decision, but simply cannot be reconciled with the actual
holding in Vigil.5 The binding legal principle articulated in Vigil is not the dicta found in

5

Indeed, as stated above, had this Court actually intended to make a knowing
state of mind sufficient for an attempted murder conviction, an analysis much closer to
the MPC approach would have been adopted. Because this Court made a more
limiting interpretation of Utah's statutory scheme, and thereby required an intentional
state of mind for attempted murder, one must conclude that footnote 5 is in fact dicta,
that it cannot be reconciled with the holding in the case, and therefore was not binding
precedent on the court of appeals.
12

footnote 5, which is absolutely contrary to the holding in that case. In other words, if
attempted murder can be accomplished knowingly, as suggested in footnote 5, then a
jury cannot be properly instructed on the mens rea element of the offense if, as the
holding in Vigil requires, the state must prove a conscious objective or desire to cause
death. In practical terms, and as pointed out in the petition for certiorari, a trial court
putting together jury instructions in an attempted murder case would be faced with the
possibility of two utterly conflicting instructions on the required mental state, yet each
statement of the law has justification in language found in the Vigil opinion. The first
hypothetical instruction would read as follows:
You are instructed that in order to find the defendant guilty of the crime of
attempted murder you must conclude that he acted intentionally or
knowingly. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848 n.5.
This instruction would then be preceded or followed by another instruction providing the
statutory definitions of "intentionally" and "knowingly." And yet the trial judge in the
hypothetical attempted murder case would also be presented with this jury instruction,
with language lifted straight out of the holding in Vigil:
You are instructed that in order to find the defendant guilty of the crime of
attempted murder you must conclude that he had a conscious objective or
desire to cause the death of another person. Vigil 842 P.2d at 848.
Arguably, Vigil provides legal authority in support of either instruction. However, as
Casey argued in the court of appeals, the language in Vigil supporting a broader
interpretation of the statute, one that would include "knowingly" as a correct formulation
of the crime of attempted murder, was part of a footnote in the opinion and not part of
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the actual holding. In Vigil this Court examined the state of mind necessary for an
attempted murder conviction. While the posture of the case was a challenge to a
conviction for attempted depraved indifference murder, the crux of the analysis (and the
legal underpinnings of the decision) was the interpretation of the attempt statute in
attempted murder cases. Vigil explained that a conviction must be based on proof of a
conscious objective or desire to kill, and that the mental element required for depraved
indifference murder did not meet this test.
Similarly, in this case the court of appeals held that proof that a person acted
knowingly will satisfy the mental element of attempted murder, even though "knowingly,"
as it is defined under section 76-2-103(2), clearly does not mean the same thing as "a
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result," which is the
language defining "intentionally" under section 76-2-103(1).
Different sentences in Vigil would seem to lead to opposite results. However, the
central principle of Vigil is not the conflicting statement in footnote 5, but rather the
Court's interpretation of Utah's attempt statute, which requires that the word "intent" in
section 76-4-101(2) be given the same meaning as the definition provided for
"intentionally" under section 76-2-103(1). The interpretive inconsistency must surrender
to the core holding in Vigil that an attempted murder conviction must be based upon a
conscious objective or desire to cause death. If footnote 5 in Vigil is good law, then it
only follows that the holding which requires a conscious objective or desire to kill is, as
a practical matter, of small legal significance since a knowing state of mind describes
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something quite different than a conscious objective or desire to cause a specific result.
Casey contends that footnote 5 is dicta, and should have had no precedential value in
the determination of this issue by the court of appeals. The fact is that in Vigil this
Court was not presented with the specific issue of whether attempted murder can be
accomplished with a knowing state of mind. What the opinion in Vigil did do, however,
was fix an exact standard, in precise language lifted verbatim from section 76-2-103(1),
for the mental state required for attempted murder. That language cannot be
reconciled with footnote 5 and the language defining "knowingly" in section 76-2-103(2).
Accordingly, the jury was improperly instructed on the count of attempted murder
since the instructions permitted an alternative finding of guilt that the crime was
accomplished with a "knowing" state of mind. This result, and the decision of the court
of appeals affirming the attempted murder conviction, is incompatible with the actual
holding (as opposed to footnote 5) in Vigil. This Court should now hold that, consistent
with Vigil and the plain meaning of Utah's attempt statute, a person must act with a
conscious objective or desire to kill in order to be found guilty of attempted murder; a
person cannot be convicted of that crime if the evidence demonstrates only that he
acted knowingly.
Finally, because of the serious risk of a patchwork jury verdict in this case, where
some jurors might have found that Casey acted intentionally and others that he acted
knowingly, this matter must be remanded to the district court for a new trial. See State
v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1993).
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Casey requests this Court to
reverse his conviction for attempted murder and remand the case to the district court for
a new trial.
DATED this d^>

d a y 0f

/ \ 01/,

2 001.

MICHAEL R. SIKORA
Lawyer for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner
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, 2001 to:
Jeffrey S. Gray
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
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Bln^-d on Iha defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED MURDER a 2nd
l>Hjree Felony, the defendant ia sentenced to an indeterminate term
ol n«-M; Vofej}.., than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
Sl,il*0 Ptifcoii.

r.V\jx:d on" Liu- defendant: ' s conviction of DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN
!-'Hl::,rJKNCT': r>\> c.'Mii.D a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced
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iV-jfeu.'d on i.ho defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd
iv.'jrvo K-lony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not tofcxcrjedfive years in the Utah State Prison,
COMMLTMKNT iy to begin immediately.
T O u\(}. HALT LAKR County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
cni'f.^dy for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
-civ^r-ijt-lcTMl* will be. confined.
SKMTUNU-: PUTSON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
All counts are to run consecutive and all enhancements are
oonst-cutive.
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Fine:
Suspended:
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Due:
fTotal

Fine:
Suspended:
TolaJ Surcharge:
Tot/il Principal Due:
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$1000.00
$0.00
$850.00
$1850,00
$1000,00
$0
$850,00
$1850.00
Plus Interest
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ecutivo on count 1.

Defendant is sentenced to a firearm

onlia ucemoftt oi: 0-5 years to run consecutive on count 2, Defendant
j u r: cnteriLT-d to a firearm enhancement of 0-5 years to run
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ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (5141)
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Judge Building Suite 212
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone (801) 575-6653; Fax (801) 575-6654

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

'

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MICHAEL SHAWN CASEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

:

CASE NO. 991908093FS

:

HON. A. M. STIRBA

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that MICHAEL SHAWN CASEY, Defendant/Appellant
in the above-entitled action, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals from the final
judgment/order rendered against him/her on the 10th day of January, 2000, by the Honorable
Anne M. Stirba, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DATED this fO

day ofJamiaiy, 2000.
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ROGER K. SCOWCROEj
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Utah 84111, and the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300
South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this /*
2000.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Michael Shawn CASEY, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 20000122-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 28, 2001.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Anne
Stirba, J., of attempted murder and aggravated assault, and he appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Billings, J., held that required mental state for attempted murder under statute,
providing that criminal homicide constitutes
murder if a defendant intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another, is "intent
or knowledge."
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <S=>1158(1)
Statutory interpretation presents a
question of law, and therefore, appellate
court reviews the trial court's rulings interpreting statutes for correctness and gives no
deference to its conclusions.
2. Criminal Law <3=>29(14)
Aggravated assault and attempted murder were not necessary to each other and
were separated by time, place, and intervening circumstances, and thus, statute providing that, when same act of defendant establishes offenses which may be punished under
different provisions, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision did not bar
defendant's conviction of both offenses; aggravated assault occurred in driveway when
defendant pointed gun at victim, and as he
drove, he committed separate act of attempted murder by pointing gun and pulling trigger. U.C.A.1953, 76-1-402(1).

rately sufficiently instructed the jury that it
could not convict defendant of aggravated
assault and attempted murder based on the
same evidence.
4. Criminal Law <3=>1038.1(2)
Absent a showing of manifest injustice,
appellate court will refuse to review jury
instructions to which party did not object in
the trial court, and manifest injustice requires that the error be obvious and be of
sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party. Rules Crim.Proc,
Rule 19(c).
5. Criminal Law ®=>1038.1(3.1)
Defendant's claim that the statutory elements, jury instructions, and evidence established that the aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of the attempted murder
was not preserved for appeal since there was
no evidence in the record that defendant
objected to the jury instructions at trial or in
his motion for a new trial and since defendant did not argue on appeal that the error
was obvious and of sufficient magnitude so as
to constitute manifest injustice. Rules Crim.
Proc, Rule 19(c).
6. Homicide <3=>25
Required mental state for attempted
murder under statute, providing that criminal homicide constitutes murder if a defendant intentionally or knowingly causes the
death of another, is "intent or knowledge."
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-203(l)(a).

Michael R. Sikora, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and
Jeffrey S. Gray, Assistant Attorney General,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, P.J. and
BILLINGS, and DAVIS, JJ.
OPINION

3. Criminal Law <3=>795(1.5)
Instruction stating that separate crime
or offense is charged in each count of the
information and each charge and evidence
pertaining to it should be considered sepa-

BILLINGS, Judge:
111 Defendant Michael Shawn Casey appeals his convictions of attempted murder, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah
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Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203(l)(a) and 76-4-101
(1999), and aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103 (1999).1 Defendant argues he
was improperly convicted of attempted murder because the jury was not instructed that
attempted murder requires the "intent" to
cause a death. He also argues he was improperly convicted of aggravated assault and
attempted murder because the offenses were
based on the same conduct. We affirm.

threatened her again. Hearing the argument, the friend's uncle emerged from the
house and told them to leave. Defendant
apologized, backed out of the driveway, and
drove away.

113 Seeing Defendant point the gun at
Franz, the friend told them to leave. Defendant put the gun down and agreed to leave.
As Allred returned to the car, Franz fled into
the house. However, she returned a few
minutes later because she realized her son
was not with her. After Franz returned,
Defendant began arguing with her and

[1] 116 This appeal presents issues of
statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law; "[therefore, we review the trial court's ruling[s] for
correctness and give no deference to its conclusions." State v. Vigil 842 P.2d 843, 844
(Utah 1992); see also State v. Keppler, 1999
UT App 89,114, 976 P.2d 99.2

1. Defendant was also convicted of domestic violence in the presence of a child, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 5 109.1 (1999), and received enhanced penalties
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1999), for
use of a dangerous weapon. He does not appeal
the conviction or the enhancements.

issues until his motion for a new trial. Ordinarily the failure to timely raise an issue waives that
issue. See Utah R.Crim. P. 12(d). However,
when a trial court considers the merits of an
issue raised in a motion for a new trial, the issue
is preserved for appeal. See State v. Seale, 853
P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) (concluding objection
to admission of videotape due to failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411 was preserved for appeal because trial court addressed
merits); State y. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 2 n. 3 (Utah

114 Before they reached the end of the
block, Defendant pointed the gun at Franz's
face and pulled the trigger, but the gun
misfired. Defendant then shot at Franz's
feet, but missed, the bullet lodging in the
floorboard. Defendant then pushed the gun
barrel to Franz's head, but before he could
BACKGROUND
pull the trigger, Franz pushed his arm in the
U 2 " We view the facts in the light most air and jumped from the car. As she
favorable to the jury verdict and recite them jumped, the gun discharged again. During
accordingly.'" State v. Lopez, 2001 UT App the altercation, three shots were successfully
123,112, 419 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 24 P.3d 993 fired.
(citation omitted). In early 1999, Defendant
1f 5 Defendant was charged with attempted
was romantically involved with Tresa Franz murder, aggravated assault, domestic vio(Franz). After drinking alcohol with Terron lence in the presence of a child, and enAllred (Allred) and Franz, Defendant drove hanced penalties on each count for using a
Allred, Franz, and Franz's son around. dangerous weapon. The jury convicted DeThey eventually stopped to purchase a pint fendant on all counts. Prior to sentencing,
of rum. Defendant drank most of the pint Defendant's counsel withdrew. Subsequentand became intoxicated and belligerent to- ly, appointed counsel filed a motion for a new
wards Franz. Franz asked Defendant to trial, arguing that the trial court improperly
take her home, but he instead threatened to instructed the jury on the mens rea required
kill her and drove to a friend's house. At the for attempted murder and that the aggravathouse, Allred left the car to speak with the ed assault was a lesser included offense of
friend. Defendant and Franz began arguing, the attempted murder. Following a hearing,
and Franz asked if he was ready to go home. the trial court denied Defendant's motion.
Defendant responded, "Fuck you, bitch. I'm Defendant filed this appeal.
going to take you home all right," and pointed a handgun at Franz's neck.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

2.

The State does not argue that we should not
consider the mens rea or lesser included offense
issues because they were not preserved for appeal. However, Defendant did not raise these
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quires a mental state greater than "knowing." See Maestas, 652 P.2d at 904-05. The
I. Was Defendant Properly Convicted of court offered two rationales for its decision.
Attempting to "Intentionally or Know- First, the court interpreted paragraph one of
ingly" Cause Franz's Death?
the attempt statute to require "only the kind
11 7 Defendant argues that Utah's Criminal of culpability otherwise required for the comCode requires the State to prove that he had mission of the [completed] offense." Id. at
the "intent" to cause Franz's death. There- 904 (alteration in original) (quotations omitfore, he argues the jury wTas improperly in- ted). Accordingly, the court concluded that
structed that the required mental state was "there [is] no difference between the intent
"intentionally or knowingly" and his convic- required as an element of the crime of attempted first degree murder and that retion must be reversed.
quired for first degree murder." Id. Alter11 8 The attempt statute provides:
natively, the court explained, even if the
(1) [A] person is guilty of an attempt to common law governed, the "intentional or
commit a crime if, acting with the kind knowing" mental state required for first deof culpability otherwise required for gree murder was sufficient under the comthe commission of the offense, he [or mon law. See id. at 905.
she] engages in conduct constituting a
1110 Significantly, the jury instructions in
substantial step toward commission of
Maestas
were similar to the jury instructions
the offense.
in the present case. They "described the
(2) [C]onduct does not constitute a sub- elements of attempted first degree murder
stantial step unless it is strongly corro- and defined the terms 'intentionally' and
borative of the actor's intent to commit 'knowingly' in precisely the language used by
the offense.
the Utah Criminal Code." Id. at 907 (citing
ANALYSIS

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999). Defendant was charged with attempted murder
under section 76-5-203(1 )(a) of the murder
statute (the "intentional or knowing" alternative). This section provides: "Criminal
homicide constitutes murder if [a defendant]
. . . intentionally or knowingly causes the
death of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5203(l)(a) (1999).
11,9 Both parties rely on State v. Maestas,
652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982) and State v. Vigil
842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992). Construing the
attempt and murder statutes in Maestas, the
Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim that an
attempt to commit first degree murder 3 re :
Ct.App.1993) (concluding objection to supplemental jury instruction was preserved for appeal
because trial court considered and ruled on merits). Although Defendant did not raise either
issue until his motion for a new trial, the trial
court considered and ruled on the merits of these
issues. Therefore, we conclude the issues were
preserved for appeal.
3.

In 1991 the Legislature changed "first degree
murder" to "aggravated murder" and "second
degree murder" to "murder." Act of 1991, ch.
10, §§ 8-9, 1991 Utah Laws 74, 78-79 (codified
as amended Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202 to 203 (1999)). The "intentional or knowing" men-

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(l)-(2) (1953)).
The Maestas court specifically noted that the
jury "received proper instruction[s] concerning the act and intent requirements for the
crime charged." Id.
1111 Subsequently, in Vigil, the Utah Supreme Court held that attempted murder
under the depraved indifference murder alternative in section 76-5-203(1 )(c)4 is not a
crime. See Vigil, 842 P.2d at 843-44. The
court first noted the mental state required to
support a depraved indifference murder conviction is "knowledge" that conduct "created
a grave risk of death to another." Id. at 844.
The court then rejected the Maestas court's
tal states required for aggravated murder in section 76-5-202(1) and murder in section 7 6 - 5 203(1 )(a) are identical. See State v. Johnson, 821
P.2d 1150, 1160 n. 6 (Utah 1991). Aggravated
murder requires aggravating circumstances to
accompany the mental state. See id. at 1156.
4.

"Criminal homicide constitutes murder if [the
defendant] . .. acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to another and thereby causes the death of
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(c)
(1999).
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interpretation of paragraph one of the attempt statute. Paragraph one provides that
an attempt occurs when a defendant "acts
with the 'kind of culpability otherwise required' " for the underlying offense. Id. at
845 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1)).
The court construed that language "to refer
to the attendant circumstances, if any, of the
underlying offense." Id. at 845-46 (footnote
omitted).
1112 The court then construed paragraph
two of the attempt statute. Paragraph two
provides that "the defendant's conduct must
be corroborative of his or her 'intent to commit the offense.'" Id. at 845 (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 76-4-101(2)). The court concluded paragraph two limits attempts to offenses with the mental state of "intent," as
defined by section 76-2-103(1). See id. at
847. Section 76-2-103(1) defines "intent" as
" 'conscious objective or desire.' " Id. (emphasis and citation omitted). Accordingly,
the court held:
[T]o convict a defendant of attempted second degree murder, the prosecution must
prove that the defendant had a conscious
objective or desire to cause the death of
another. Because the mental state required for depraved indifference homicide
falls short of that intent, the crime of
attempted depraved indifference homicide
does not exist in Utah.
Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
1113 Although in Vigil the court overruled
Maestas in part, the court expUcitly refused
to completely overrule Maestas and approved
the second rationale articulated in Maestas.
The first alternative rationale relied on in
Maestas is clearly inconsistent with . . .
[State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989),
State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982),
and State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah
1978) ] and with our holding in the instant
case. Thus, that portion of Maestas . . . is
5. Following Vigil, Utah appellate courts have
stated without analysis that the mental state required for an attempted murder conviction under
the "intentional or knowing" alternative is "intent" to cause a death or "knowledge that one's
acts would result in death if carried out" State v.
Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 642 (Utah 1997) (plurality opinion), or knowledge that "conduct [is] reasonably certain to cause [a] death." State v.

incorrect. However, we note that Maestas
is still good law insofar as it authorizes
prosecution for attempted aggravated
murder under the intentional or knowing
formulation of section 76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional or
knowing formulation of section 76-5203(1) (a).
Id. at 848 n. 5. (emphasis added). Thus,
Vigil explicitly allows a conviction for a
"knowing" mental state under § 76-5203(l)(a), which is the section under which
Defendant was convicted.
f 14 Defendant argues that following Vigil,
attempted murder requires the "intent" to
cause a death, therefore, the "knowing" state
of mind in the "intentional or knowing" alternative is insufficient. We disagree. The
court noted, "The issue before us is narrowf,-]
. . . to determine whether . . . the 'knowing*
mental state required for depraved indifference homicide under section 76-5-203(l)(c)
. . . is sufficient to satisfy the mental state
required by Utah's attempt statute." Id. at
844. If the court intended to eliminate attempted "knowing" murders under the "intentional or knowing" alternative, instead of
writing that uMaestas is still good law insofar
as it authorizes prosecution for . . . attempted murder under the intentional or knowing
formulation of section 76-5-203(l)(a)," id. at
848 n. 5 (emphasis added), the court could
have simply written that Maestas is still good
law insofar as it authorizes attempted "intentional" murders under section 76-5203(l)(a).5
II. Was Defendant Properly Convicted of
Aggravated Assault and Attempted
Murder?
1115 Defendant argues that the aggravated
assault and attempted murder should not
have been charged as two separate offenses
because they were one offense in the same
White, 880 P.2d 18, 23 (Utah Ct.App.1994); see
also State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 n. 3
(Utah Ct.App.1992) (noting required mental state
is "intent" or "knowledge"); cf. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1991) (noting
prior to Vigil mental state required is "intent" or
"knowledge"); State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d
1323, 1325 (Utah 1983) (same).
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criminal episode and because the aggravated
assault was a lesser included offense of the
attempted murder. Under section 76-1402(1):
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions
of this code, the act shall be punishable
under only one such provision....
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1999).
f 16 The clear intent of this section is that
"[a] defendant may not be punished twice for
[the same] act." State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d
896, 900 (Utah 1986). Thus, we must determine if the conduct supporting the aggravated assault and attempted murder were the
"same act." See State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61,
63 (Utah CtApp.1989).
1117 Utah appellate courts have concluded
acts are independent if they are in no way
necessary to each other or sufficiently separated by time and place. See State v. Young,
780 P.2d 1233, 1239 (Utah 1989) (concluding
forcible sexual abuse and forcible sodomy
supported two counts of aggravated sexual
assault because they were in no way necessary to each other); O'Brien, 721 P.2d at 897,
900 (concluding defendants who broke into
cabin, then later pointed guns at owners,
threatened to shoot them, held them at gun
point for several hours, took money from
them, and then kidnaped them, were properly sentenced for aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnaping because the crimes were the result of separate
and distinct acts); State v. Porter, 705 P.2d
1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (concluding defendant
committed two separately punishable burglaries when he broke into an apartment within
twenty minutes of breaking into a laundryroom in the same "apartment house").
[2] 1118 We conclude the aggravated assault and attempted murder were not necessary to each other and were separated by
time, place, and intervening circumstances.
The aggravated assault occurred in the
driveway. Defendant stated, "Fuck you,
bitch. I'm going to take you home all right,"

then pointed a gun at Franz's neck. Seeing
Defendant point the gun at Franz, the friend
told him to leave and he put the gun down.
Franz then fled the car into the house.
Clearly, the assault was complete at this
point.
1119 Following the assault, Franz remained
in the house for a few minutes. Franz then
returned to the car, and Defendant began
arguing with her again. The friend's uncle
emerged from the house and told them to
leave. Defendant then backed the car out of
the driveway. As Defendant drove down the
street, he committed the separate act of attempting to murder Franz by pointing a gun
at her head and pulling the trigger. He then
shot at her feet and pushed the gun barrel to
her head.
1120 Clearly, the aggravated assault and
attempted murder were in no way necessary
to each other and were separated by time,
place, and intervening circumstances. Thus,
we conclude section 76-1-402(1) does not bar
Defendants conviction of both offenses.
1121 Defendant next argues that the statutory elements, jury instructions, and evidence establish that the aggravated assault
was a lesser included offense of the attempted murder. He therefore argues he was
improperly convicted of both offenses under
section 76-1-402(3):
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999) (emphasis added).
1122 The State concedes, and we assume
without deciding, that Defendant's conduct
while driving involved an aggravated assault
which merged into an attempted murder.
However, the issue in this case is not whether Defendant was improperly convicted of a
lesser included offense based on his conduct
while driving. Rather, the issue is whether
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the assault on Franz in the driveway followed
by the attempted murder while driving down
the street were separately proved at trial.
1123 In State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611 (Utah
Ct.App.1998), this court considered whether
aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of aggravated burglary. See id. at 617.
The evidence demonstrated three separate
assaults had occurred, two in the victim's
house and one in the defendant's car. See id.
at 619. We noted, "While it is true that [the]
defendant twice assaulted [the victim] during
the aggravated burglary, he assaulted her a
third time after he left the scene of the
burglary and was in the act of committing
aggravated kidnaping." Id. Therefore, we
concluded, "[T]he elements of aggravated assault were established by proof of more than
'all the facts required to establish' the aggravated burglary." Id. (quoting Utah Code
Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a) (1995)). We then considered "whether the jury was properly instructed to find this additional proof." Id.
We concluded that because the jury was
instructed that it had to find an additional
element to convict the defendant of aggravated assault, that the defendant intentionally
caused serious bodily injury, under the facts
of the case, aggravated assault was not a
lesser included offense of aggravated burglary. See id.

aggravated assault and attempted murder
based only on the acts in the driveway or
only on the acts committed while driving
down the street. Cf State v. Ross, 951 P.2d
236, 245 (Utah Ct.App.1997).
[3] 1125 Defendant argues the jury was
not instructed that it could not convict Defendant of aggravated assaulted and attempted
murder based on the conduct while driving.
However, the jury was instructed that "[a]
separate crime or offense is charged in each
count of the information. Each charge and
the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately." (Emphasis added.)

[4,5] 1126 Arguably this instruction sufficiently instructed the jury that it could not
convict Defendant of aggravated assault and
attempted murder based on the same evidence.6 Moreover, there is no evidence in
the record that Defendant objected to the
jury instructions at trial or in his motion for
a new trial. "[R]ule 19(c) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides that in order
to preserve an issue involving a jury instruction, the objecting party must make an objection in the trial court, 'stating distinctly the
matter to which he objects and the ground of
his objection.'" State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d
1221, 1227 (Utah 1998) (quoting Utah
R.Crim. .P. 19(c)). "Accordingly, absent a
1f 24 Unlike Betha, the aggravated assault showing of manifest injustice, . . . [we will]
in the present case has the same elements as refuse to review jury instructions to which
the attempted murder, but was based on [a] party did not object in the trial
different facts. However, Betha counsels court
" Id. Manifest injustice requires
that a jury must be instructed appropriately that the error be "obvious" and "be of suffiso it does not convict a defendant twice on cient magnitude that it affects the substantial
the same facts. See id. To uphold Defen- rights of a party." Id. at 1226 (quotations
dant's conviction, we must find that a reason- and citation omitted). Defendant does not
able jury would have understood that based argue on appeal that the instructions meet
on the instructions, arguments, and evidence either of these requirements. Therefore, his
at trial, it could not convict Defendant of lesser included offense argument fails.
6. The State's arguments make it clear that the
aggravated assault and attempted murder were
based on separate conduct. In her opening argument the prosecutor stated:
[Defendant has] been charged with three
crimes. He's been charged with aggravated
assault. And that's for pointing a gun at
[Franz's] head while they were parked behind
[the friend's] house. He's been charged with
attempted homicide. And that's for pointing a
gun at [Franz], pulling the trigger and trying to
kill her.

In closing, the prosecutor stated:
Going in chronological order . . . first of all,
[Defendant has been] charged with aggravated
assault.... And I submit to you that when
[Defendant] was at [the friend's] house, he
pointed a gun at [Franz] . . . threatening her
with a dangerous weapon. That is an aggravated assault. The attempted homicide, Count
1. And [Defendant] took that gun and he pointed it at [Franz's] head in the car and he pulled
the trigger. [Defendant] attempted to kill . . .
[Franz].
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CONCLUSION
[6] 1127 We conclude that the required
mental state for attempted murder under
section 76-5-203(l)(a) is "intent or knowledge," and therefore, the jury was appropriately instructed in the present case. We also
conclude that Defendant's aggravated assault
and attempted murder convictions were
based on independent acts and were separately proven at trial. Therefore, we affirm
Defendant's convictions.
1128 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T.
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and
JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge.

when applying law to the facts. U.C.A.1953,
78-3a-913(l)(a).
2. Appeal and Error <3=>840(3)
Constitutional issues, including that of
due process, are questions of law which appellate court reviews for correctness.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
3. Criminal Law <s=>641.4(2)
In criminal context, waiver of counsel
must be shown to have been made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 6.
4. Criminal Law <°>641.7(1)
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STATE of Utah, in the interest of A.E.,
D.E., C.E., and S.E., persons under
eighteen years of age.
M.E., Appellant,
v.
State of Utah, Appellee.
No. 20000325-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 28, 2001.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 9, 2001.
Father appealed from judgment of the
Second District Juvenile Court, Ogden Department, L. Kent Bachman, J., terminating
his parental rights. The Court of Appeals,
Bench, J., held that father waived his statutory right to counsel.
Affirmed.
1. Infants <3=>251, 252
Appellate court reviews a waiver of statutory right to counsel in termination of parental rights case for correctness, but grants
trial court reasonable measure of discretion

Preferred method of ascertaining waiver
of right to counsel in criminal proceedings is
colloquy on the record between trial court
and defendant, and absent this colloquy, valid
waiver may be demonstrated if the record
reflects penetrating questioning by trial
court to determine that defendant is aware of
nature of charges, statutory offenses included within them, range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to
charges and circumstances in mitigation
thereof, and all other fact essential to broad
understanding of the whole matter.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
5. Infants <3=>205
A waiver of statutory right to counsel in
termination of parental rights proceeding is
proper as long as record as a whole reflects
the parent's reasonable understanding of
proceedings and awareness of right to counsel. U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-913(l)(a).
6. Infants <S=>205
Trial court's on the record discussion
with father, coupled with the fact that father
had been represented by appointed counsel
since termination of parental rights proceedings were first initiated, indicated that father
had reasonable understanding of proceedings
and of his right to counsel when he chose not
to communicate with his attorney, and, thus,
father waived his statutory right to counsel.
U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-913(l)(a).

